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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE S. PERKINS and 
LILLIE PERKINS, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants , 
vs. 
INTERLAKE THRIFT, a Utah 
corporation, et al., 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
> Supreme Court No. 20642 
) District Court No. C82-6009 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
The case before the court had been bifurcated into two 
trials denominated as Phase I and Phase II. The issues for 
review before this Court are set out accordingly, as the 
Appellant has appealed rulings from both trials. 
A. PHASE I. 
1. Priority of title as between the owner of real 
property, the purchaser, and the purchase money 
lender. 
2. The effect of the Recording Act §57-3-2 and 
-1-
§57-3-3, U.C.A. (1953, as amended). 
3. Subordination by Seller of property to purchase 
money lender, 
4. Constructive notice to Lender of Seller's retained 
interest. 
5. Duty of Seller to enforce Sales Agreement. 
6. Application of Merger Doctrine in sale of real 
property. 
B. PHASE 
1. Election of remedies by Trial Court in granting 
monetary damages rather than rescission. 
2. Duty of Seller to mitigate his damages. 
3. Trial Court's failure to award punitive damages. 
4. Adequacy of Attorney fees awarded to Seller. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
PHASE I. The Perkins, the real property owners (Sellers), 
brought suit against the purchaser of the real property, Coombs 
Investment Corporation, referred to as CIC (Buyer) and the 
purchase money lender, Interlake Thrift (Lender), to determine 
the priority of liens on the real property when the Buyer 
defaulted and failed to make his payments to the Lender. In 
the course of the purchase the Buyer had given to the Seller a 
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second Trust Deed to secure a Promissory Note for the balance 
of the purchase price, 
PHASE II, In the refinancing of the delinquent loan for 
the Buyer, the Lender required a subordination by the Seller of 
his retained interest in the property. Lender failed to 
disclose some of the terms of the refinanced loan for which 
Trial Court awarded damages and attorney fees in behalf of 
Seller. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
On July 26, 1982, the Sellers filed a Complaint in 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
against Dick E. Coombs (Coombs), Coombs Investment Corporation 
(Buyer) and Interlake Thrift (Lender). Coombs and CIC filed a 
Third-party Complaint against Century 21 Monson and Company, 
Peter R. Lucero and Jessie Monson. Interlake Thrift 
cross-claimed against Coombs and brought a Third-party 
Complaint against Guaranty Title Company, Southern Title 
Guaranty Company, Mark Williams and Ruth R. Coombs. The 
Third-party actions Monson and Company, Lucero and Monson were 
subsequently dismissed pursuant to motion and stipulation. 
Interlake's claim against Williams was dismissed after Phase I 
at the trial. Actions by and against Coombs and Ruth Coombs 
were stayed by the bankruptcy filings during the course of the 
actions. 
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C. DISPOSITION BY LOWER COURT. 
The Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, bifurcated the trial on this matter due to the 
multiplicity of issues that centered around two separate 
transactions; the initial sale of the real property in question 
on October 31, 1980 and the refinancing of the Buyer's loan 
with the Lender on November 27, 1981. The two trials were 
heard without a jury. 
PHASE I. The Trial Court dealt with :^he issues of priority 
between the Seller who owned the real property, the Buyer and 
the Lender. Lender was found to have priority in the sale of 
October 31, 1980, over the Seller. All parties received a 
judgment against Buyer, but no judgments were taken against 
Coombs and Ruth R. Coombs due to the Automatic Stay of their 
personal bankruptcy filings. 
PHASE II. The Trial Court dealt with the issues 
surrounding the refinancing of the original loan by Buyer and a 
personal loan of Coombs with Lender that resulted from Buyer's 
default on the original loan of October 31, 1980. In the 
refinancing of the original Promissory Note and Trust Deed of 
October 31, 1980, Lender required that the Sellers subordinate 
their second position Trust Deed to that of Lender. The Trial 
Court found that in obtaining the Subordination Agreement from 
the Sellers, Lender had failed to disclose certain relevant 
facts and Lender's actions constituted fraud and award actual 
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damages in favor of the Sellers in the amount of $2,464.41 
together with attorney's fees in the sum of $2,500.00 for a 
total judgment of $5,136.87. Lender paid Sellers the judgment 
amount on April 6, 1984, and a Satisfaction of Judgment, 
reserving the right of Seller to appeal, was granted Lender on 
December 1, 1984, by the Trial Court. (R.,p. 905-907) Costs 
granted to the Sellers in Phase II were disallowed by the Trial 
Court in a proceeding on December 26, 1984. (R. , p.892-894) 
Numerous post trial motions to amend and for a new trial were 
brought by the Sellers which were denied. Sellers brought this 
action appealing certain issues in Phase I and Phase II as were 
found by the Trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACT. 
The statement of facts will follow the segmented format 
as to Phase I and Phase II. 
A. PHASE I. 
1. George S. Perkins and Lillie Perkins, husband and 
wife, (Sellers) were the owners and occupiers of a residence 
located at 54 South Jeremy Street, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. In June of 1980, they determined to 
sell their residence and listed the property at 54 South Jeremy 
Street, with Peter R. Lucero, a real estate agent of Century-21 
Monson and Company. 
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2. On September 17, 1980, Paul S^ott, a real estate 
agent for Coombs Investment Corporation, (Buyer) met with the 
Sellers in their home with Sellers1 realtor, Lucero. Scott 
presented them with an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase. (R., p.213-214) (Ex., 1-P) The Earnest Money Receipt 
and Offer to Purchase was signed by Sellers on September 22, 
1980, along with a Counter Offer of the same date. (Ex., 15-D) 
While in the home, Scott made a presentation outlining the 
terms and conditions of the Earnest Money to both Sellers and 
Lucero, their Realtor. 
3. At the same meeting on September 17, 1980, Scott 
spelled out in detail the subordination of Sellers to a 
purchase money lender that was to be chosen by Buyer to fund 
the purchase from Sellers. (R., p.1246, 1.10-25). The Earnest 
Money of September 17, 1980, provided on Line 51 (Ex., 1-P) 
that the Sellers would Deed their interest in the home to 
Buyer. Buyer would then convey a second Trust Deed to Seller 
after conveying a first Trust Deed to a Lender. The Earnest 
Money also provided that Buyer could substitute collateral for 
the second Trust Deed to Sellers with other collateral than the 
54 South Jeremy property. That Seller signed the Earnest Money 
Agreement and an attached Counter Offer on September 22, 1980, 
are facts not in dispute. The Earnest Money and the Counter 
Offer of September 22, 1980, were both accepted by Buyer on 
September 23, 1980, again a nondisputed fact. 
4. In early October 1980, Coombs, President of Buyer, 
contacted Lender's Manager, Ronald D. Adams, with the purpose 
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of taking out a loan with Lender. (Depo. of Adams 11-12-82; 
p.12,17) Coombs represented to Adams that Buyer wished to buy 
the property at 54 South Jeremy Street with funds provided by 
Lender. (R.,p.1027) Adams informed Coombs that before Lender 
could loan money to Buyer the 54 South Jeremy Street property 
would have to be vested in the name of the Buyer, and that 
Lender would have to be placed in a first position in the 
property before Lender could make the loan to Buyer. (R.,p.1033 
1.25; p.1034 1.1,25) 
5. During the entire period of negotiations between 
Buyer and Lender, no contact was made between Lender and 
Seller. (R.,p.1028, 1.4 - 6; p.1033, 1.10 - 12) Lender was 
not aware of the circumstances or terms of the purchase between 
Buyer and Seller nor the fact that Buyer intended to grant 
Seller a second Trust Deed as security for the balance of the 
purchase price. (R.,p.1034, 1.16-23; R.,p.1036, 1.16-24) 
6. On October 29, 1980, Buyer executed a Promissory 
Note and Trust Deed to Lender in the amount of $20,756.44. The 
Trust Deeds secured a first interest in the property at 54 
South Jeremy Street. (Ex., 5-P and 6-P) On the same date, 
Lender prepared Escrow Instructions to Guaranty Title Company 
for closing the transaction between Buyer and Seller. The 
instructions required the Title Company to place Lender in a 
first position before disbursement of funds could be made. The 
document was acknowledged by Buyerfs President, Coombs. (Ex., 
2-P) 
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7. On October 31, 1980, the closing of the transaction 
between Buyer and Seller took place at Guaranty Title Company 
in Salt Lake City. Those in attendance were Seller (both Mr. 
and Mrs. Perkins) their realtor, Lucero, Coombs as President of 
Buyer, Scott, Buyer's Realtor, and the closing officer, Mark J. 
Williams. No representative from Lender was present at the 
closing. (R.,p.1079, 1008, 1081) 
8. During the closing on October 31, 1980, the closing 
officer spent approximately an hour goincj through the documents 
and explaining the transaction to the parties present, 
including Seller and their realtor, Lucero. Specifically, the 
closing officer informed Seller that they would receive a 
second position Trust Deed in regard to their property and that 
Lender would be in a first and prior position on the property, 
Neither Seller nor his Realtor asked any 
objections as to the information on documents presented. 
Seller executed the documents in the presence of all the 
parties at closing. (R.p.1084, 1.20-25; jf.1085, 1.1-20; 
R.,p.1093, 1.7-23; R.,p.1101, 1.11-17, 20-25; p.1102, 1.1-8; 
p.1230, 1.19-25) 
9. At the conclusion of the closing of October 31, 
1980, the executing parties, Seller signed an unrestricted 
Warranty Deed and Buyer a second position Trust Deed and 
Promissory Note. The closing officer disbursed the funds in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of the Escrow Letter 
of October 29, 1980, by Lender. On the same day, October 31, 
1980, the documents were recorded in order of priority pursuant 
questions or made any 
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to the terms of the Earnest Money Agreement and the Escrow 
Instructions of the Lender. Seller unrestricted Warranty Deed 
to Buyer was recorded first as Entry No. 3497140, Book 5172, 
Page 719. The Trust Deed from Buyer to Lender was recorded 
next as Entry No. 3497141, Book 5172, Page 720, placing Lender 
in a first position to the Warranty Deed from Seller to Buyer, 
pursuant to the Escrow Instructions and Earnest Money 
Agreement. The Trust Deed from Buyer to Seller was recorded as 
Entry No. 3497142, Book 5172, Page 722, in a second position 
behind Lender, again in accordance with the Earnest Money 
Agreement of September 17, 1980, and the Escrow Instructions of 
October 29, 1980. (Ex., 1-P, 2-P) 
10. Subsequently, on October 31, 1980, Guaranty Title 
Company prepared and furnished Lender a Policy of Title 
Insurance through its underwriter, Southern Title Guaranty 
Company, in the amount of $20,756.44 the amount of the Trust 
Deed from Buyer to Lender. (Ex., 12-P) The Title Policy 
showed the property vested in Buyer with Lender holding a first 
Trust Deed on the property. The Policy did not show any 
interest by Seller, nor was there any communication to Lender 
of Seller's interest. 
11. At the closing of October 31, 1980, Seller received 
from the proceeds of the transaction (loaned by Lender to 
Buyer) $10,301.25 as was set out by the Seller's Settlement 
Statement. (Ex., 9-P) (R.,p.1294, 1.9-13) 
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B. PHASE II. 
All facts under Phase II occurred subsequent to October 
31, 1980, and relate to issues as were litigated in Phase II of 
the Trial. 
12. During the year 1981, Buyer became delinquent upon 
the terms and conditions of the Promissory Note and Trust Deed 
of October 29, 1980. Lender gave Buyer three alternatives to 
resolve the default, (1) to bring the Promissory Note current; 
(2) refinance the loan with Lender; or (3) Lender could 
foreclose its Trust Deed. Buyer elected to rewrite the loan. 
Coombs, the President of Buyer also had a delinquent personal 
loan with Lender which he requested Lender to consolidate in 
the refinancing of the Promissory Note of October 31, 1980, to 
reduce the combined monthly payments. Coombs also requested 
that the term of the Note be shortened. (R., p.1386, 1387) 
of 57 South Jeremy 
time of Sellers 
13. Upon examination of the title 
Street, Lender became aware for the first 
second position Trust Deed. (R., p.1377, 1.4-6; p.1431, 1.2-5) 
As a condition of refinancing the Trust Deed and Promissory 
Note of October 29, 1980, Lender required Buyer to obtain a 
Subordination Agreement from the Seller in order to preserve 
the prior position that Lender had obtained in the original 
closing on October 31, 1980. (R.,p.1392, 1.4-23) The 
Subordination Agreement was given to Buyer to present to the 
Seller and have executed as a condition of completing the loan. 
(Ex. 40-D) (R.,p.1354, 1.9-16) 
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14. On November 27, 1981, subject to an executed and 
recorded Subordination Agreement, Buyer refinanced the 
Promissory Note of October 29, 1980, paying off the balance of 
that Note in the amount of $22,093.89 and paying off the 
remaining balance of Coomb's personal loan with Lender in the 
amount of $2,464.41. The total of the new Promissory Note of 
November 27, 1981, was the sum of $24,558.30 (R.,p.1398, 
1.14-25; p.1399, 1.1-3). A Declaration of Business Purpose 
was executed by Buyer on November 27, 1981, stating the new 
loan was a "commercial loan". (Ex. 51-P) 
15. The Promissory Note and Trust Deed of November 27, 
1981, while executed by Buyer was still contingent upon receipt 
and recording of the executed Subordination Agreement of 
November 27, 1981. The Subordination Agreement was given to 
Buyer to have it executed by Seller. Seller refused to sign 
the Subordination Agreement for Buyer. 
16. During the month of December 1981, Lenderfs Officer 
talked with Seller for the first time and subsequently with 
their attorney, Robert Knight, who had been retained to advise 
the Seller on the execution of the Subordination Agreement. 
17. On December 30, 1981, Lender's Officer talked with 
Knight on the telephone and subsequently wrote a letter to him 
indicating that the Promissory Note of November 27, 1981, would 
be larger than the old loan in addition to the interest and 
costs. (Ex., 41-D) Lender's Officer did not inform Sellers or 
their attorney that that Promissory Note of November 27, 1981, 
included the consolidation of a personal note of Coombs for 
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$2,464.41 which was now included in the ainount of the 
Promissory Note of November 27, 1981 which totaled $24,688.70. 
However, Seller and their attorney were furnished the total 
amount of the consolidated loan of $24,688.70 which was stated 
on the face of the Subordination Agreement which Sellers and 
their attorney reviewed prior to execution of the Subordination 
Agreement. (Ex., 40-D) 
18. On December 30, 1981, Sellers, in the presence of 
their attorney, Knight, executed the Subordination Agreement of 
November 27, 1981, which contained the amount of the new 
Promissory Note of November 27, 1981, in the amount of 
$24,688.70. Knight, their attorney, notarized the 
Subordination Agreement and had in his presence at the time of 
the notarization, Lender's letter of December 30, 1980. (R., 
p.1430, 1.4-6; p.1445, 1.1-25) Sellers and their attorney were 
informed by Lender that if Sellers did not sign the 
Subordination Agreement, Lender would hav£ no alternative but 
to foreclose on the property. (R.,p.1431, 1.6-19, 25) 
19. The executed Subordination Agreement was 
subsequently returned to Lender who had it recorded on January 
6, 1982, as Entry No. 3637295, Book 5329, Page 6. The Trust 
Deed of November 27, 1981, was recorded as Entry No. 3637296, 
Book 5329, Page 7. The Promissory Note and Trust Deed of 
October 29, 1980, were paid off from the (proceeds of the 
November 27, 1981, loan as was Coombs personal loan. (Ex., 
34-D, 35-D, 33-D) 
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20. By May of 1982, Buyer defaulted on its Promissory 
Note to Lender, and a Notice of Default was recorded on June 
10, 1982. A Notice of Sale was recorded on October 29, 1982. 
The sale of the property was held on December 7, 1982, and was 
sold by Lender with the Lender being the only bidder at the 
sale. Lender purchased the property with a bid of $36,068.73, 
the amount then due and owing on the Promissory Note of 
November 27, 1981, together with the costs and expenses of 
sale. 
21. Lender listed the real property at 54 South Jeremy 
Street for re-sale on January 8, 1983. (R.,p.1482, 1.9-11) 
(Ex.,58-D) The property was subsequently sold on September 15, 
1983, to a third party for the sum of $28,700.00 at 12% 
interest, with Lender providing the financing. (Ex., 57-D) 
(R.,p.1494, 1.6-22) 
22. During the course of the foreclosure and resale of 
the property, Lender suffered a loss on the real property of at 
least $7,368.73. (R.,p.1417, 1.12-25; p.1418, 1.1-25) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. PHASE I. 
Point 1. Priority of Title; The priority of title in 
this case is controlled by Kemp vs. Zions First National Bank, 
Utah 470 P.2d 390 (1970). The Trial Court correctly found that 
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the elements contained in Kemp were found in the case at hand 
as follows: 
(a) Unrestricted Warranty Deed, Seller 
executed at the closing an unrestricted Warranty Deed 
that followed the intent of the Earnest Money Agreement 
to subordinate the Seller's interest to that of the 
Lender. 
(b) Reliance by Lender, The Lender's total 
involvement in the transaction beginning with the 
negotiation with the Buyer and th^ Escrow Instructions 
to the Title Company, showed that the loan would not 
have been made without the Lender being placed in a 
first position on the property. 
(c) Lack of Knowledge by Lender. Lender had 
no constructive or actual knowledge of Seller's 
retained interest. Lender had no contact with the 
Seller. The Buyer failed to inform the Lender of any 
retained interest as did the Title Company. 
(d) Priority of Recording. The actual 
recordation of the conveyances followed the intent of 
the parties, the documents comprising the written 
agreements between the parties and the sales 
presentations. 
(e) Accepted Proceeds. The Seller accepted 
the proceeds of the sale without disclosing his 
retained interest to Lender. 
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Point 2. Subordination by Seller, The entire 
transaction from the sales presentation, the Earnest Money 
Agreement, the Escrow Instructions to the Title Company, the 
presentation of the closing officer, through the recordation of 
the documents clearly show that it was the intent of all 
parties that the Seller subordinate his interest to the Lender. 
Point 3. No Constructive Notice to the Lender, The 
only notice Lender had of Seller was a Preliminary Title Report 
showing the property vested in the Seller's name. Lender acted 
on this knowledge by requiring a subordination of Seller's 
position and there was no basis in fact for Lender's 
constructive notice of Seller's retained interest. 
Point 4. Duty of Seller to Inquiry. Seller had a 
responsibility to ensure that its contract with the Buyer was 
performed in accordance with the terms and conditions of that 
Contract. Seller cannot shift the responsibility to enforce 
that Agreement to the Lender who had no knowledge of the 
Agreement or its terms. 
Point 5. The Merger Doctrine Applies. Lender pleaded 
the Merger Doctrine in its Amended Answer to Plaintiff's 
Unified Complaint. Merger is presumed and Sell€>r failed to 
rebutt the presumption. 
B. PHASE II. 
Point 1. Rescission is Not an Appropriate Remedy. 
Rescission of the Subordination Agreement of November 27, 1981, 
would have placed the Seller in such a position as to be unable 
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to receive any monetary damages. Sellei: would have been 
subject to the foreclosure of the Trust Deed of October 29, 
1980, and not entitled to a monetary damage award by virtue of 
his claimed election of remedies.. 
Point 2. Mitigation of Damages. Seller had a duty to 
try to mitigate his damages at the foreclosure of the Trust 
Deed of November 27, 1981, and failed to do so. The 
consolidation of a personal loan with the commercial loan 
resulting in the increase of the amount of the loan by 
$2,465.41 did not relieve the Seller of his duty to mitigate. 
Point 3. Punitive Damages Not Warranted. The conduct 
of the Lender was not willful nor malicious. The facts and 
circumstances and amount of damages were not sufficient to 
support punitive damages. The loan of November 27, 1981, was 
in compliance with Utah Consumer Credit Code. The Lender made 
no profit by his misconduct. 
Point 4. Award of Attorney's Fees was Reasonable. 
The Trial Court in its discretion correctly reduced Seller's 
attorney's fees due to duplicative and ^warranted legal 
proceedings instigated by Seller. 
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A R G U M E N T 
A, PHASE I , 
POINT 1, THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT LENDER 
MAINTAINED ITS PRIOR POSITION IN THE REAL 
PROPERTY SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Under the facts of this case, priority of title is 
controlled by Kemp vs. Zions First National Bank, Utah 470 P. 
2d 390 (1970). The elements necessary for establishing a 
preference to a Lender who loans money for a purchase money 
mortgage on real property are set out in Kemp, supra, on Page 
393: 
"We have been shown no authority which 
approves giving preference to a purchase 
money mortgagee under facts as found by 
the Trial Court set forth above; where 
such claimants have been given an 
unrestricted Warranty Deed, knowing that 
the financing bank was going to rely on 
it; where the bank had neither actual or 
constructive knowledge that the vendor 
retained an interest in the property, 
and the latter, who had failed to record 
their own mortgage, in full knowledge of 
facts, went to the bank and in effect 
approved the transaction by accepting 
their share of the proceeds therefrom, 
but without disclosing that they retained 
an interest" [emphasis added] 
The Trial Court in applying the criteria set out above 
correctly found that the instant case closely followed the 
facts of Kemp, supra, and found the Lender had preference over 
the Seller who sold his property to the Buyer on October 31, 
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1980. The elements of Kemp, supra, as applied to the facts of 
the instant case are as follows: 
(a) Unrestricted Warranty Deed; Seller 
knowingly and intentionally subordinated their priority 
in the property by virtue of the terms and the 
conditions of the Earnest Money Agreement of September 
17, 1980, (Ex., 1-P). That Agreement at Line 51, set 
out with particularity that the Seller would 
subordinate its interest to a Lender of the Buyer's 
choice. Furthermore, the Seller at the closing of the 
transaction at the Title Company on October 31, 1980, 
was explained the terms and the conditions of the 
transaction by the closing officer, Williams, who 
explained in detail the transaction and the 
subordination of the Sellerfs interest to the Lender. 
(R.,p.1084, 1.20-25; p.1085, 1.11-20; R.,p.1093, 
1.17-23; R.,p.1101, 1.11-17, 1.20-25; R.,p.1102, 1.1-8; 
R.,p.1230, 1.19-25) Additionally, the Seller had 
opportunity to examine the Lender's Escrow 
Instructions, received explanations by the Closing 
Officer, reviewed the unrestricted Warranty Deed and 
executed the same knowing that it would be recorded. 
(b) Reliance by Lender. The Lender's 
involvement in the transaction and willingness to make 
the loan was conditioned upon it being placed in a 
first position in the title to the real property. This 
was clearly stated by the Lender's Officer many times 
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during the course of the transaction. (R.,p.1035, 
1.25; R.,p.1034, 1.1,25) The Lender provided Escrow 
Instructions to the Title Company who acted as a 
fiduciary to close the transaction for both parties, 
which instructed that the monies accompanying the 
Escrow Letter were not to be disbursed unless the 
Lender was placed in a first position. (Ex., 2-P) 
(c) Lack of Knowledge by Lender. The Lender 
had no knowledge of Seller's retained interest in the 
closing of the parties on October 31, 1980. The Lender 
had never met the Seller. (R.,p.1028, 1.4-6; p.1033, 
1.10-12) Lender was not aware of the circumstances of 
the purchase nor of the retained interest by the 
Seller. (R., p.1034, 1.16-23; R.,p.1036, 1.16-24) 
The Seller never disclosed to the Lender that they had 
retained an interest in the real property. Neither the 
closing officer of the Title Company disclosed to 
Lender that Seller had maintained an interest in the 
property, nor did the Title Policy of Insurance, which 
was issued subsequently by the Title Company, disclose 
any subsequent or retained interest in the property by 
the Seller. (Ex., 12-P) 
(d) Priority of Recording. The recording of 
the various Conveyances was in accordance with the 
facts and circumstances that existed during the entire 
course of the transaction between the Seller, Buyer and 
Lender. The priority of the recording followed the 
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representations made in the sales presentation of the 
Buyer to the Seller on September 17, 1980, where Scott, 
Buyer's Realtor presented the Earnest Money Agreement 
to Sellers. (R.,p.1246, 1.10-25) The Earnest Money 
Agreement of September 17, 1980, also contained a 
subordination clause which would give the Lender 
priority. (Ex., 1-P) The Lender's Escrow Instructions 
to the Title Company also provided that the Lender's 
interest would have a priority, (fex., 2-P) The 
exclamation of the closing officer at the closing to 
the Seller and the Buyer also followed the same 
intended sequence, (please see referenced citations 
stated above) The documents themselves were recorded 
in the proper sequence as their entry numbers so 
disclose. (Ex.,4-P, 5-P, 7-P) 
(e) Accepted Proceeds. Seller accepted and 
took the proceeds of the sale furnished by the Lender 
and did not disclose to Lender its retained interest in 
the property. (Ex., 9-P) (R.,p.1294, 1.9-13) 
Point 2. SELLER INTENTIONALLY SUBORDINATED ITS 
PRIORITY TO THE LENDER IN THE TITLE TO 
THE REAL PROPERTY. 
The Trial Court correctly found that the Seller had 
subordinated its priority in the title to the real property to 
that of the Lender. That subordination to the Lender was a 
constant and ever present condition in the entire sales 
transaction from the beginning to the end as is more 
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particularly set out above in Point 1. While certain 
variations existed from the terms of the Earnest Money 
Agreement of September 17, 1980 to the Promissory Note of 
October 29, 1980, between the Lender and the Buyer in the 
amount of the loan, the rate of interest and the term of 
repayment; there was no vagueness in regard that were would be 
a subordination of the Seller's interest to that of the Lender. 
(Ex., 1-P, 6-P) Seller's failure to inquire as to the terms 
of the loan and the execution of the unrestricted Warranty Deed 
constituted a waiver and estoppel to any subsequent objection 
to the ultimate terms of that Promissory Note as were nego-
tiated between the Buyer and the Lender. The terms of the 
Earnest Money Agreement were merged into the unrestricted 
Warranty Deed. Any discrepancy between the Earnest Money 
Agreement and the final Promissory Note between the Lender and 
the Buyer dealt with terms of and performance of the agreement 
between the Seller and the Buyer. The responsibility to ensure 
performance with that agreement was the Seller's, not the 
Lender as is suggested by Seller's argument on appeal. 
The Seller cites several cases in support of its 
position. Miller vs. Citizens Savings and Loan Association, 
Ct. App., 56 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1967), under facts that are 
substantially different from the case before the Court, holds 
that rights of priority under an Agreement of Subordination 
extend to and are limited strictly by the express terms and 
conditions of the Agreement. However, in the instant case the 
terms of the Earnest Money Agreement are vague and broad. The 
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only point that is not vague or broad, is that the Lender shall 
have priority, which in the instant case bccurred at the 
recording of the unrestricted Warranty Deed. 
The case of Troj vs. Chesebro, (Conn.) 296 A2d 685, 
(1972) had facts substantially different from the instant case 
as well, in that the subordination provisions were entirely 
silent, thus creating a statute of frauds problem. That is not 
the case here. The Subordination Agreement was not silent and 
that while the terms were vague and broad and left latitude in 
the final incorporation of those terms, they clearly avoid a 
statute of frauds problem. These cases should not be 
controlling. 
POINT 3. THE LENDER RECEIVED NO ACTUAL OR 
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF SELLER'S 
RETAINED INTEREST. 
The Lender had no actual or constructive notice of the 
retained interest by the Seller in the real property. Lender's 
Preliminary Title Report (Ex., 11-P) showed the property vested 
in the Seller. The Lender responded to this knowledge by 
informing the Buyer that any loan would be conditional upon the 
Buyer being the vested owner and the Lender being placed in a 
first position in the title to the property. (Please see Point 
1. above for citations) Under the Escrow Instructions, the 
closing at the Title Company, the sequence of the recording of 
the documents, and the Policy of Title Insurance all confirm 
that priority as was required by the Lender. As is more fully 
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set out in Point 1. above, no information was given to the 
Lender as to the subsequent retained interest by the Seller in 
the property by any of the parties or fiduciaries involved. 
The Lender's notice of the vested interest in the Seller at the 
beginning of the transaction had been resolved to the 
satisfaction of the Lender to protect his position. There was 
nothing to alert the Lender of any subsequent retained interset 
in the property by the Seller. 
POINT 4. SELLER HAD A DUTY TO INQUIRE AS TO 
THE TERMS OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE 
OF OCTOBER 29, 1980. 
The Seller and the Buyer had contracted independently 
to buy and sell real property by virtue of their Earnest Money 
Agreement of September 17, 1980. As contracting parties they 
had the responsibility of ensuring that the terms of the 
Earnest Money Agreement were followed. Nothing in the terms of 
the Earnest Money Agreement of September 17, 1980, required 
that any other party or entity assumed that enforcement 
responsibility. Seller cannot shift the responsibility to 
enforce the Earnest Money Agreement to the Lender, who had no 
contract or contact with the Seller, no knowledge of the 
Earnest Money Agreement, who escrowed the funds with the Title 
Company, did not attend the closing, and never became aware of 
the Seller's retained interest in the property, either before 
or after the transaction was completed. 
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The Seller would urge the Court to believe it was the 
Lender who created the loss and, therefore, should suffer the 
loss rather than the Seller. As authority for that proposition 
it sites Hansen vs. Beehive Security Company, Utah, 380 P.2d 
66 (1963) . That case sets out the proposition that a loss 
should fall on him who created circumstances from which the 
loss resulted where one of two innocent parties must suffer a 
loss. Assuming, as the facts show, that the loss was created 
by the default of the Buyer in making the payments on the 
Promissory Note to the Lender, it was not the Lender who 
created the circumstances from which the loss resulted. It was 
the Seller who had contracted with the Buyer in September of 
19 80, and agreed to the terms of the Earnest Money Agreement 
and had completed the transaction. It was the Seller who 
created the circumstances. Based upon the holding of the 
referenced case above, it is the Seller yho must suffer the 
loss. 
POINT 5. THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT AND THE 
UNRESTRICTED WARRANTY DEED WERE SUBJECT 
TO MERGER. 
The Trial Court was correct in determining that the 
Merger Doctrine applied to the Earnest Money Agreement of 
September 17, 1980, and the unrestricted Warranty Deed of 
October 31, 1980 from the Seller to the Buyer and the resultant 
Trust Deed and Promissory Note to the Lender from the Buyer. 
The terms of the Earnest Money Agreement of September 17, 1980, 
were vague and ambiguous as to the amounts, rate of interest 
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and term of repayment that the Buyer could undertake with the 
Lender. While there were differences between the Earnest Money 
Agreement and the Promissory Note of October 29, 1980, those 
differences were not material or substantial enough to prohibit 
the merger of the Earnest Money Agreement into the Promissory 
Note and Trust Deed. 
A presumption of merger is established where parties 
finalize the transaction with documents that differ from the 
initial documents. Sellers failed to rebutt this presumption 
by their total lack of inquiry or attempt of enforcement of 
those terms at the closing at the Title Company on October 31, 
1980. Neither the Seller nor their realtor made any inquiry 
as to the terms and conditions of the Buyer and Lender's 
Promissory Note. 
The general doctrine of merger in the State of Utah has 
been established by a series of cases which established the 
doctrine that when a deed executes a contract for the sale of 
land, all provisions of any prior contract are merged into the 
deed. If a party subsequently denies merger due to a mistake, 
that party has the party to show mistake by clear and 
convincing evidence. Neeley vs. Kelsch, Utah 600 P.2d 979 
(1979); Rasmussen vs. Olton, Utah, 583 P.2d 50 (1978); Espinoza 
vs. Safeco Title Insurance Company, Utah, 598 P.2d 346 (1979); 
and Baxter vs. Stubbs, Utah, 620 P.2d 69 (1980) 
The Trial Court correctly found that the presumption of 
merger had not been rebutted by the Seller with clear and 
convincing evidence. The terms of the Earnest Money Agreement 
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of September 17, 1980, were vague and quite broad and failed to 
contain any information as to the term of repayment payment, 
and while the resulting Deeds and Promissory Notes finalizing 
the parties agreement, varied from the teitms of the Earnest 
Money Agreement, the differences were not substantial enough to 
deny a merger. 
Contrary to the assertion of the Seller, Lender pled 
the merger. Lender pled the Merger Doctirine in its Amended 
Answer to Plaintiff's Unified Amended Complaint as its Fifth 
Affirmative Defense, filed with the Trial Court on September 
26, 1983. (R., p.496) 
B. PHASE II 
POINT 1. RESCISSION WAS NOT AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY 
FOR THE SELLER AS AN ELECTION OF DAMAGES. 
The Trial Court correctly determined that rescission 
was not an appropriate remedy for Seller. The voiding or 
rescission of the Subordination Agreement of November 27, 1981, 
by the Court as urged by the Seller, would not have placed the 
Seller in a first position in the real property as asserted by 
the Seller on appeal. The Trust Deed of October 29, 1980, was 
to be released only upon the condition precedent that the 
Lender remain in its first priority position when it undertook 
to refinance and pay off the Trust Deed of October 29, 1980. 
The refinancing and rewriting of the Trust Deed of October 29, 
1980, with the new Trust Deed of November 27, 1981, was 
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conditional upon the Seller signing a Subordination Agreement 
and its recordation. 
Without the Subordination Agreement of November 27, 
1981, no refinancing would have been accomplished and hence the 
Trust Deed of October 29, 1980, would not have been paid off or 
released. The priority of the Lender would have remained in 
the same position as it was during the course of the Trust Deed 
of October 29, 1980, that is, maintaining a first priority 
position in the title to the property. The Seller would have 
maintained its second Trust Deed position. (R., p.1352, 1.4-23) 
Thus, had the Trial Court rescinded the Trust Deed of November 
27, 1981, due to the Lender's misconduct in obtaining the 
Subordination Agreement of November 27, 1981, the Seller would 
have been subject to foreclosure of the delinquent Promissory 
Note and Trust Deed of October 29, 1980. The Trial Court by 
assessing actual monetary damages suffered by the Seller was 
more beneficial to the Seller than had the Court rescinded the 
Promissory Note and Trust Deed of November 27, 1981. 
POINT 2. SELLER HAD A DUTY TO MITIGATE HIS DAMAGES 
IN THE FORECLOSURE OF THE TRUST DEED OF 
NOVEMBER 27, 1981. 
The Trial Court correctly held that it is generally 
accepted law in the State of Utah that the Seller had a 
responsibility to mitigate his damages by curing the default of 
the Buyer in his Trust Deed with the Seller, and that the 
Seller failed to do so. This principle of law is supported by 
a body of cases in the State of Utah. Utah Farm Production 
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Credit Association vs. Cox, Utah, 627 P.2d 62 (1981); Thompson 
vs. Jacobsen, Utah, 463 P.2d 801 (1970) 
The Seller on appeal would urge this Court that it was 
the misconduct of the Lender that prohibited the Seller from 
mitigating his damages. The misconduct of the Seller in 
failing to disclose all the terms of the Subordination 
Agreement of November 27, 1981, made no appreciable difference 
in the damages to the Seller. Had Sellerf not executed the 
Subordination Agreement of November 27, 1981, Lender would have 
foreclosed the Trust Deed of October 29, 1980. The amount to 
cure the default under the Trust Deed of November 27, 1981, was 
$24,688.70 as opposed to the balance of $22,224.29 to cure the 
default of the Trust Deed of October 29, 1980, a difference of 
$2,464.41. (R.,p.1398, 1.14-25; p.1399, 1.1-3) The Seller 
would have had the duty to mitigate his damages under either 
Trust Deed foreclosure. There was no showing by the Seller 
that the difference of $2,464.41 restricted the Seller from 
mitigating his damages under the foreclo$ure of the Trust Deed 
of November 27, 1981. 
POINT 3. PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE NOT WARRANTED TO 
SELLER. 
The Trial Court correctly held not to award punitive 
damages against the Lender in behalf of the Seller. Punitive 
damages constitute an extraordinary remedy outside the granting 
of normal damages incurred by the damaged party. Punitive 
damages go beyond the mere violation of the rights of the 
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Seller which occurred here. For punitive damages to be 
correctly awarded, conduct of the Lender would have had to be 
found to be "willful and malicious." First Security Bank of 
Utah vs. J.B.J. Feedyards, Utah, 653 P.2d 591 (1982) 
The conduct of the Lender was not willful nor 
malicious. The Lender failed to disclose to the Seller only 
that the Promissory Note of November 27, 1981, included a 
personal loan of the President of the Buyer. The Lender fully 
disclosed to the Seller the entire amount of the new combined 
Promissory Note. The facts and circumstances surrounding the 
transaction do not warrant nor support punitive damages. 
Seller would urge this Court that the refinancing of 
the Promissory Note of October 29, 1980, and the Consumer Loan 
of Coombs, violated the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code. The 
statutes do not support that view. §70B-3-206 U.C.A. (1953, as 
amended) deals with loan finance charges and setting certain 
limits of those finance charges (the statute has since been 
repealed, but was in effect at the time of the transaction in 
question) in the consolidation of a "consumer loan" with 
another "consumer loan" or a "consumer credit sale". This 
statute does not deal with the question of a consolidation of a 
"commercial loan" as the UCCC places "Commercial Loans" 
outside the purview of the statute. 
A review of the facts clearly shows that it was the 
intent of the parties that the loan be a "commercial loan", and 
a Declaration of Business Purpose was executed by the Buyer on 
November 27, 1981. (Ex., 51-P) The proceeds from the new loan 
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completely paid off and satisfied the "commercial loan" of 
October 29, 1980, and Coomb's personal consumer loan. (R., 
pl398, 1.14-25; p.1399, 1.1-3) A totally new and separate 
loan was consummated at the same time by virtue of the 
Promissory Note of November 27, 1981, secpred by a Trust Deed 
on the property in question. The Utah Uniform Consumer Credit 
Code clearly places no limit on the finanpe charge of that 
transaction as it was a "commercial loan"!. 
supported by the 
"70B-3-605. FINANCE CHARGE FOR OTHER LOANS. 
With respect to a loan other than a consumer 
loan the parties may contract for the payment 
by the Debtor of (any) finance charge." 
[emphasis added] 
The Seller would also urge the Court that the Lender 
made a significant profit and thus shoulq be subject to 
punitive damages. That assertion is not 
record. The Lender sold the property forf $7,368.73 less than 
it bid for the property at its own Trustee's sale and had to 
finance the long term financing at 12% iriterest for the new 
Buyer, which was substantially less than the rate with the 
original Buyer. (Ex., 57-D) R.,pl494, 1,16-22; p.1417, 
1.12-25; p.1418, 1.1-25) 
POINT 4. ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDED TO THE SELLER 
WERE REASONABLE 
The Trial Court correctly reduced the attorney's fees 
requested by the Seller to the sum of $21500.00. The Trial 
Court in assessing the attorney's fees indicated it had 
reviewed the file in detail and, in fact, had heard the case 
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from its inception. The Trial Court stated that the pleadings 
and the record clearly supported a reduction of attorney's fee 
claimed. A review of the Index of the pleadings clearly reveal 
the Seller's unwarranted and unnecessary judicial proceedings 
with duplicate depositions, numerous pre-trial and post-trial 
hearings and motions brought by the Seller that were redundant 
and unnecessary. (R., p.976, 1.1-11) 
CONCLUSION 
A. PHASE I. 
Lender would urge that the Trial Court's ruling as to 
Phase I be affirmed and maintained as this case clearly fits 
within the parameters set out in Kemp vs. Zions First National 
Bank, supra,. The case at hand is even stronger as the Seller 
in its Earnest Money Agreement clearly subordinated his 
priority in the title of the real property to that of the 
Lender. The testimony of the witnesses present during the 
entire transaction from the inception of the sales presentation 
until the closing, confirm that conclusion. The documents 
involved in the transaction are unequivocal in assuming that 
there would be a subordination, and those documents subject to 
recordation followed that subordination sequence. It was the 
intent of the parties that the Seller subordinate his interest 
to the Lender. That was clearly found by the Trier of Fact and 
it is urged that this Court affirm that prior decision. 
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B. PHASE II. 
While the Lender does not agree with the Trial Court's 
finding that the Lender was guilty of misconduct in the 
execution of the Subordination Agreement in the loan of 
November 27, 1981, and the resulting granting of damages and 
attorney's fees, the Lender has chosen not to appeal that 
ruling. The Lender would urge this Court to affirm the Trial 
Court's determination as to damages and attorney's fees as they 
are reasonable appropriate in view of th0 Trial Court's ruling, 
and are supported by the facts and surrounding circumstances. 
Lender would pray that the costs of this Appeal be 
assessed against the Seller, as the judgment of the Trial Court 
has been satisfied by the Lender and that there is no clear 
basis in law for the Seller to prevail on his appeal. 
DATED this 21st day of October, 1985. 
HUNT AND RUDD 
HOLLIS S. HUNT 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
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ADDENDUM 
57-8-2. Eeoord imparts notioe.—Every conveyance, or instrument in 
writing affecting real estate, executed, acknowledged or proved, and 
certified, in the manner prescribed by this title, and every patent to lands 
within this state duly executed and verified according to law, and every 
judgment, order or decree of any court of record in this state, or a copy 
thereof, required by law to be recorded in the office of the county recorder 
shall, from the time of filing the same with the recorder for record, impart 
notice to all persons of the contents thereof; and subsequent purchasers, 
mortgagees and lien holders shall be deemed to purchase and take with 
notice. 
67*3. Effect of failure to record.—Every conveyance of real estate 
hereafter made, which shall not be recorded as provided in this title, 
shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for 
a valuable consideration of the same real estate, or any portion thereof, 
where his own conveyance shall be first duly recorded. 
70B-3-205. Loan finance charge on refinancing. With respect to a 
consumer loan, refinancing, or consolidation, the lender may by agreement 
with the debtor refinance the unpaid balance and may contract for and 
receive a loan finance charge based on the principal resulting from the refi-
nancing at a rate not exceeding that permitted by the provisions on loan 
finance charge for consumer loans (section 70B-3-201) or the provisions on 
loan finance charge for supervised loans (section 70B-8-508), whichever is 
appropriate. For the purpose of determining the loan finance charge per-
mitted, the principal resulting from the refinancing comprises the follow-
ing: 
(1) if the transaction was not precomputed, the total of the unpaid bal-
ance and the accrued charges on the date of the refinancing, or, 
if the transaction was precomputed, the amount which the debtor 
would have been required to pay upon prepayment pursuant to the 
provisions on rebate upon prepayment (section 70B-3-210) on the 
date of refinancing, except that for the purpose of computing this 
amount no minimum charge (section 70B-3-210) shall be allowed; 
and 
(2) appropriate additional charges (section 70B-3-202), payment of 
which is deferred. 
- 3 4 -
ADDENDUM 
70B-3-206. Loan finance charge on consolidation* 
(1) If a debtor owes an unpaid balance to a lender with respect to a 
consumer loan, refinancing, or consolidation, and becomes obligated 
on another consumer loan, refinancing, or consolidation with the 
same lender, the parties may agree to a consolidation resulting in 
a single schedule of payments. If the previous consumer loan, refi-
nancing, or consolidation was not precomputed, the parties may 
agree to add the unpaid amount of principal and accrued charges 
on the date of consolidation to the principal with respect to the 
subsequent loan. If the previous consumer loan, refinancing, or con-
solidation was precomputed, the parties may agree to refinance the 
unpaid balance pursuant to the provisions on refinancing (section 
70B-3-205) and to consolidate the principal resulting from the refi-
nancing by adding it to the principal with respect to the subsequent 
loan. In either case the lender may contract for and receive a loan 
finance charge based on the aggregate principal resulting from the 
consolidation at a rate not in excess of that permitted by the provi-
sions on loan finance charge for consumer loans (section 70B-3-201) 
or the provisions on loan finance charge for supervised loans 
(section 70B-3-508), whichever is appropriate. 
(2) The parties may agree to consolidate the unpaid balance of a con-
sumer loan with the unpaid balance of a consumer credit sale. The 
parties may agree to refinance the previous unpaid balance pur-
suant to the provisions on refinancing sales (section 70B-2-205) or 
the provisions on refinancing loans (section 70B-8-205), whichever 
is appropriate, and to consolidate the amount financed resulting 
from the refinancing or the principal resulting from the refinancing 
by adding it to the amount financed or principal with respect to 
the subsequent sale or loan. The aggregate amount resulting from 
the consolidation shall be deemed principal, and the creditor may 
contract for and receive a loan finance charge based on the prin-
cipal at a rate not in excess of that permitted by the provisions 
on loan finance charge for consumer loans (section 70B-3-201) or 
the provisions on loan finance charge for supervised loans (section 
70B-3-508), whichever is appropriate. 
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